The best-case scenario for Hong Kong
Words by Sui Yuet
The author of this article is writing under a pseudonym. The Pulp Editors agreed given the material and current context.
As the Hong Kong anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (ELAB) protests enter their third month with no sign of abating, one question that has been cropping up—with little sign of a definitive answer—is how this will all end.
The ELAB has little support within Hong Kong, even among those who now criticise the protesters. The bill proposes to establish extradition agreements with countries that Hong Kong currently has no agreements with. Though a sound proposition by principle, many Hongkongers fear that this will allow China—which is infamous for human rights abuses—to arbitrarily extradite political dissidents. The effects of the proposed law also extend to the international community, which threatens Hong Kong’s status as a cosmopolitan city. Tourists or people on business passing through the airport could become targets of extradition. This has the potential to cut the number of tourists and international corporations visiting or operating in Hong Kong.
Of course, the protests have spiralled outwards in scope since the initial wave. The protesters’ frustrations have been compounded by the Hong Kong government’s inaction and the increasing use of violence from the police force. Their five demands to the government are:
1. The complete withdrawal of the proposed ELAB.
2. The withdrawal of the term “riot” used to characterise the 12 June protest (rioting is a punishable offence under Hong Kong law).
3. The release of arrested protesters.
4. An independent inquiry into the actions of the police.
5. The implementation of genuine universal suffrage and resignation of Carrie Lam.
Graphic showing the protesters’ 5 demands. Source: SCMP
A best-case scenario would involve Lam sitting down in a public forum with the key protesting groups and working out a compromise with them on the demands. It is unlikely that the government would accept all of the demands, but the least onerous ones would be (1), (2), and (4). (1) is within the Hong Kong government’s jurisdiction. (2) is also reasonable, since most commentators believe that riot police had been responsible for the violence during the 12 June protest. As for (4), an independent inquiry would exonerate the police if their conduct had been faultless, and more importantly restore trust between citizens and police.
But can this happen?
Lam has both held and attempted to hold discussions with different interest groups in Hong Kong. None of them have been public so there is no accountability. So far, she has requested once to speak with student union leaders. Since she refused to let the discussion be broadcast publicly, the students became suspicious of her intentions and did not agree to meet with her.
As her stance against the protesters has doubled down, Lam has met with business leaders to discuss “economic problems”. Anonymous attendees told the press that they did not feel confident that her government had a solid plan to resolve the issues facing Hong Kong.
On the other hand, Lam has not reached out to other groups who have been protesting. These groups include lawyers, civil servants, airport and aeroplane staff, medical professionals, teachers, and social workers. This implies that she is unwilling to acknowledge these swathes of Hongkongers who have turned against her, and is determined to characterise the protesters as just students. Her recent comments that the protesters hold “no stake in society” reflect this classist and inaccurate view. By ignoring the traditionally “respectable” professionals among the protesters, she can label the protesters as troublemaking youths.
Anti-ELAB protesters hold up posters that read “Carrie Lam, resign”. Source: Winson Wong in SCMP
Lam’s current stance bodes ill for the five demands.
The first demand is, technically speaking, the easiest for Lam to accept. She has already “suspended” the bill and declared it “dead”. But she has not used the legal term “withdraw”. As such, there is every possibility that the bill could be revived at any time. Many have informed her that “dead” is not a legal term. If Lam had genuinely meant that the bill should be “withdrawn”, she would have had plenty of time to correct herself.
The fact that she has not yet withdrawn the bill suggests that there is something more sinister afoot. Hong Kong is by constitution an autonomous region, which means that all political workings are separate from the Chinese system. When reporters asked Lam if she “had the autonomy to fully withdraw the extradition bill”, she evaded the question. Constitutionally, she does in fact have the autonomy to do this. Her inability to respond affirmatively to this question suggests that her actions have been restricted by Beijing. This would breach the “one country, two systems” agreement that forms the foundation of the Hong Kong constitution.
Once Beijing is involved, the situation is much messier.
There are a couple of principles that underpin the interactions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The first is the “century of humiliation”, which refers to a period in Chinese modern history when China became subject to Western and Japanese imperialism. Viewing the world through this lens leads the CCP to foster a victim mentality, asserting that China is an underdog that foreign powers have long hated. A related principle is “face”. As a Chinese sociological concept, face is difficult to define but generally encompasses personal respectability and prestige. To admit fault and show weakness causes one to “lose face”. This is not to say that other governments are more willing to acknowledge their faults than the CCP. But given that the CCP is an authoritarian regime, losing face can undermine the faith of its citizens in itself.
Joshua Wong, one of the leaders of the 2014 Umbrella Revolution, was released from prison in June this year. Source: AFP
The fear of losing face is partly why the CCP is so determined to say that the Hong Kong protests have been stirred up by foreign powers, or “black hands”. There is little evidence for this view; even chief members of the Hong Kong police have conceded that this claim is implausible. Blaming foreigners, however, allows the CCP to ignore its own hand in fuelling discontent in Hong Kong. In the five years since the Umbrella Movement, Hong Kong has seen its elected officials ousted from parliament because of their pro-democracy stance. Pro-democracy activists from the Umbrella Revolution in 2014 were imprisoned. The CCP even declared the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, a bilateral treaty between China and the UK that guaranteed Hong Kong’s autonomy until 2047, a “historical document” with no practical significance in the present.
That is to say nothing of China’s internal affairs. Up to one million Uyghurs, an ethnic minority from the western Chinese province of Xinjiang, have been forced into camps. Their only crime is being Muslim, which the CCP deems an “extremist” threat. Uyghur refugees from these camps report that they were made to eat pork, underwent forced sterilisation, and were subject to torture. The CCP’s development of the Social Credit System, which will rank citizens by reputation with social restrictions placed on those with lower scores, has invited comparison to the “Nosedive” episode of Black Mirror. In a move that cemented the CCP’s alienation from its Communist roots, it cracked down on Marxist students who had developed a passion for Marx at university. This is all compounded by the Chinese courts having a 99.9% conviction rate, a result of them being government-controlled. All of these factors justify Hongkongers’ fear of the Chinese justice system.
For the CCP, blaming foreign powers for inciting and paying for Hong Kong protests is an abdication of responsibility. They overlook the social and political conditions that have given rise to anti-CCP sentiment in Hong Kong. Indeed, external blame prevents the CCP from having to reflect on its own actions. But it also prevents the prospect of losing face against hostile Western powers by acknowledging its own faults.
Chinese military vehicles parked in Shenzhen, the Chinese city that borders on Hong Kong. Source: Reuters
For my part, I believe that the international community welcome the CCP stepping back from conflict and provocation. Instead, it has been amassing forces on the Hong Kong border as if to threaten Hong Kong with the memory of Tiananmen. Many commentators believe that this is only a PR stunt, and the gleeful speculation in which some others have engaged of a second military crackdown is unhelpful. This speculation acclimated the international community to something which must never happen, and ought to be avoided. Still, the presence of Chinese forces represents an escalation which can only backfire on the CCP. And the fear of losing face means they cannot make a tactical retreat.
What on the outset seems like a simple solution is ultimately muddied by many external factors. By understanding these external factors, however, we can also understand the driving motivation behind Hong Kong protesters—and why the fight is so dire.